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Rodriguez-Abascal: Group Rights

ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
GROUP RIGHTS

LUIS RODRIGUEz-ABASCAC

In this presentation I I shall explore the question of whether or not it is
defensible to grant legal group rights through international instruments
and national legal systems.
I shall proceed in the following way. First, I shall briefly examine the
conceptual consistency between group rights and the framework of rights
discourse, and I shall conclude that it is conceptually possible to include
group rights in ordinary rights talk. Secondly, I shall explore what the
basic requirements would be for the recognition of a group right. I shall
suggest that the use of rights discourse bears a number of conceptual as
well as normative constraints that carry important practical
consequences, and that these constraints must be understood as
conditions of admissibility for any group right.

* Currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate
Center; Fulbright Postdoctoral Visiting Scholar at the NYU School of Law (2000102); Ph.D. in
Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy, Universidad Aut6noma de Madrid School of Law, Spain
(1999).
1. This is a presentation given at the Twelfth Annual Fulbright Symposium on International
Legal Problems held together with the Eleventh Regional Meeting of The American Society of
International Law at Golden Gate University School of Law on March 28, 2002 in San Francisco.
The original text has been edited and footnotes have been added respecting both its format and
content. I am thankful for the editorial help provided at the Golden Gate University School of Law
Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law by Ms. Roberta Simon.
This presentation was a work-in-progress in the course of a research project carried out at
New York University School of Law and financed by a Fulbright Postdoctoral Scholarship. lowe a
debt of gratitude to both the Fulbright Program and the Spanish Ministry of Culture and Education
for this scholarship. I am also grateful to David A. J. Richards and Jeremy Waldron for extremely
helpful discussions on this topic.
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THE POSSffiILITY OF GROUP RIGHTS

It has been argued that group rights raise no analytical difficulties?
There are two possible ways to understand this claim, and both
possibilities seem correct.
On the one hand, we can think of a right from a functionalist perspective.
From this point of view, the expression "to have a right" is a linguistic
shortcut, a middle link that connects one or several states of affairs with
one or several normative consequences.3 This is perfectly compatible
with the possibility of there being group rights.
On the other hand, we can examine the reasons why we consider that
someone has a right. The possibility that groups might have rights is also
open, since the two main theories in this respect, the choice theory and
the interest theory, leave unanswered the question of who qualifies as a
right-holder. This is what Makinson, Hartney and Waldron have in mind
when they claim that group rights raise no analytic difficulties.
The choice theory, prominently held by H.L.A. Hart, holds that a right is
a protected array of choices of enforcing duties that bind other people.4
In order to find a group right, therefore, the choice theory would need
only to find acceptable that some ways for the formation of collective
will are valid - i.e., voting or appointing representatives. This seems to
be non-controversial.
The interest theory, defended by Joseph Raz and his followers, holds that
a right is a protected interest that places duties on other people. s In order
to find a group right, therefore, the interest theory would need only to
admit that some interests are collective interests, both in the sense of
belonging to a group and being indivisible. This is precisely what Joseph

2.
David Makinson, Rights of Peoples: A Logician's Point of View, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEoPLES 69 (James Crawford ed., 1988); Michael Hartney, Some Confusions Concerning Collective
Rights, 4-2 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 293 (1991); Jeremy Waldron, Taking Group Rights Seriously, in
LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECfNES FROM DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (Grant
Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 2002).
3.
Alf Ross, Tu-Tu, in FETSKRIFT TIL HENRY Us SING (Borum & Illum eds., 1951), quoted
from the Spanish edition translated 'into Spanish by Genaro Carri6, Tu- ru (Abeledo-Perrot ed.,
1972).
4.
H.L.A HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); H.L.A Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (AI. Melden ed., 1958); H.L.A Hart, Are There Any
Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 2 (1955).
5.
Joseph Raz, Right-Based Moralities, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 182 (Jeremy Waldron. ed.,
1984).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/5

2

Rodriguez-Abascal: Group Rights

2003]

GROUP RIGHTS

103

Raz, Jeremy Waldron and Neil MacCormick, among others, have
claimed in defense of group rights. 6
It seems, therefore, that no conceptual consideration rules out the
possibility of there being group rights. But even if some rights might be
group rights, can they be basic or fundamental rights? Or to put it in
terms better suited for international law, can they be human rights?
The answer is yes - from a purely conceptual point of view, group
rights can be fundamental, basic or human rights. Probably the most
accepted way of understanding basic rights is to consider them as
trumping-rights, as shields that protect minorities by trumping
consequentialist considerations. 7 Nothing in this formulation precludes in
principle taking minorities as groups, as opposed to taking their
individual members one by one. Will Kyrnlicka has defended precisely
this kind of group rights for cultural minorities. He refers to them as
"external protections," and they are at the core of his theory of
differentiated citizenship.
From a substantive point of view, both major theories of rights can
accommodate fundamental group rights. The choice theory only needs to
accept that some minority decisions are particularly important or worth
protection. The interest theory only needs to consider that some of the
interests at stake are basic or fundamental, as to give rise to basic or
fundamental "rights" in the strongest possible sense.
There can be group rights, therefore, and they can be fundamental rights.

n.

THE CONDITIONS FOR GROUP RIGHTS

So far I have said nothing about there actually being group rights. The
mere possibility of the category says nothing about the actual
admissibility of any specific group right. It could very well be that group
rights are as extraterrestrial life, an open possibility that knows no actual
instances for the moment.
In order to find out whether or not there is any group right some method
of recognition is needed. One option is to look for a theory of rights that
defines what counts as a relevant consideration for the attribution of

6.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); NEIL MACCORMICK: LEGAL RIGHTS
AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1982); Jeremy Waldron, Can Communal Goods Be Human Rights?, in
LIBERAL RIGHTS 339 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1993).
7.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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rights, and what specific rights we have. I do not intend to offer such a
theory.
In what follows, I shall instead use a negative approach. I will not look

for a method of recognition, but for a method of discarding. I shall look
for criteria that can discriminate between admissible and inadmissible
group-right claims, criteria that can bring about an admissibility test. The
test will not tell, therefore, which claims qualify as group rights, but only
which claims do not qualify. In other words, I shall not offer a set of
sufficient conditions for group rights. The criteria of admissibility can
only be used as necessary conditions, without which no group right can
be granted.
What would be the conditions for group rights, then? Let me put the
question in different words. What set of circumstances would need to be
the case for a group right to be still in the realm of possibilities?
Here I shall hold that at least five conditions of admissibility apply to
group rights. They arise from the demand of consistency (either
conceptual or normative consistency) with rights discourse. These
conditions work at two levels of abstraction. First, they check the
admissibility of group-rights claims in the highest level of abstraction, as
a matter of principle. Secondly, they rule out that some specific groups in
some specific circumstances can be right-holders. The five conditions are
as follows:
1.

INDIvISffiILITY

A group right must be indivisible into individual rights. In other words,
rights that can be understood as arrays of individual rights are not group
rights. Suppose that this requirement of indivisibility was not in place.
Then all individual rights would also qualify as group rights, and the
difference between individual and group rights would vanish individual and group rights would be just two possible ways of referring
to the same thing. The way in which any individual right can be
understood as a group right is the following: individual rights always
apply to specific classes of people - in the logical sense of the word
"class." For example, individual human rights apply to the class "human
beings," the group called "humanity." Are individual human rights a
group right? Well, this is one possible way to look at them, no doubt
about it, but it is hard to see the point in doing so.
It is hard to see why it would be a good idea to use two different labels
- i.e., "individual rights" and "group rights" - to indicate one single
normative status. It is easy to see, in contrast, why it would be a bad idea:
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/5
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it would lead to confusion, misunderstandings, .and probably also to
moral errors. s If group rights were only sets of individual rights, then, the
concept of "group rights" would be redundant. If we are to use the
concept of "group rights" at all, we need to apply it to group rights that
cannot be broken up into individual rights.
Some of the frequently called "group rights" do not satisfy this condition,
and therefore, it would be advisable to stop calling them "group rights."
Examples are rights that exempt a class of people from the application of
some rules;9 rights allowing Canadian sikhs to drive motorbikes not
wearing a helmet (so they can keep their turbans on their heads,
following a religious mandate); or rights exempting from application of
anti-drug legislation some native Americans who are allowed to smoke
peyote. If these normative situations are considered to be rights, they are
individual rights, but not group rights.
2.

ENFORCEABILITY

It must be justifiable to enforce the duties that correspond to these rights.
This condition draws the difference between moral and legal rights. I
have a moral right that you always tell me the truth - with some
possible exceptions that are irrelevant here - but there is no justification
available to make it my legal right, and therefore your legal duty.
However, if you sell me a used car with a serious mechanical problem
that you are aware of, there is a really good justification for making it my
legal right that you tell me the truth about it. There are some
circumstances, therefore, in which it is justifiable to enforce some moral
duties. Only in those cases does it make sense to grant legal rights. The
fact that the right-holder is a group, rather than an individual, does not
seem to add anything to the rationale that demands some extra
justification for the use of force. What is true for individual rights in this
respect must also be true for group rights.
Is this less true for international law? No, it is not. The lack of an
enforcing agency is irrelevant here because the requirement is not an
empirical necessity, but a normative one. The enforceability condition
does not ask for the actual ability to enforce duties. It asks whether or
not it would be justified to enforce the duties arising from a group claim
in the case that we could do so. It asks a normative question in a
hypothetical world. This undoubtedly abstract question has, however, a
8.
Michael Hartney, Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights, 4-2 CAN. J.L. & JURIS.
293 (1991).
9.
Jacob T. Levy, Classifying Cultural Rights, in NOMOS XXXIX: ETHNICITY AND GROUP
RIGHTS 22 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymilicka eds., 1997).
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serious practical potential. In international law there are a great number
of situations in which this question is already relevant in practical terms
- whenever the means of coercion, pressure and enforcement that are
peculiar to it can actually be implemented. It is also relevant because the
assertion of a group right is often the beginning of a political striving that
aims to achieve changes in international law. The enforceability
requirement sets a condition for the justifiability of such political claims.
If we cannot think of any justifiable coercive enforcement, then the
possibility of granting a group right will be immediately ruled out. Any
political striving exclusively based on such a claim would, therefore, be
disqualified as unreasonable. There might still be a moral right backing
the group's political demands, but the aspiration to have a legal right
recognized by international law on the basis of this non-enforceable
moral right will have to be dropped.
The reasons that a morally justified claim may not be enforceable can be
of at least two varieties. First, it may be the case that enforcing the
correlative duty or duties is not found justifiable, but too aggressive.
Notice that this is still compatible with asserting that the group has a
moral right, and therefore that there might be some correlative moral
duties that ought to be satisfied. It is considered, however, that the use of
force is too aggressive a way of demanding these duties. Secondly, it
may be the case that the duty-holder cannot be identified, and therefore
the duty cannot be conceivably enforced. In this case, there could be
more doubts about whether or not we can even speak of a justifiable
claim, let alone a moral right.
3.

UNIVERSALIZABILITY

When universalized, the group right of one group ought not to be
incompatible with the same right of other groups that share the same
relevant characteristics. This condition carries strong Kantian moral
connotations, however stretched, since Kant never considered group
rights and it would be highly controversial to say that they fit in his
moral theory at all. Behind the logical demand of consistency lies the
moral demand of equal concern and respect for all persons as
beneficiaries of rights. On the one hand, the rights of all rights-holders
need to be compatible, because what we create when we engage in the
activity of granting rights is a system of interconnected arrays of duties.
As a system, this requires consistency between its component elements.
It is therefore crucial to shape every group right in such a way that all
agents who share the same relevant characteristics enjoy it in the same
degree. If this is not possible, then the claim cannot be a right. On the
other hand, all groups that share the same relevant characteristics must be
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/5
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treated with equal concern and respect. No group ought to be left aside.
Most of the groups for which group rights are claimed live intermingled
with other groups or share with them resources needed by all members of
the groups in order to have good lives. Equality of needs, interests or
protected choices ought to be taken into consideration. Whenever the
claimed group right cannot be exercised simultaneously by all groups
that share the same relevant characteristics considered appropriate to
identify the first right-holder, a strong reason emerges against
considering such a claim to be a right.
This condition of universalizability brings about two further effects. On
the one hand, it helps to prevent rights inflation. On the other hand, it
works as a disincentive for those groups that are ready to claim a right
for themselves and to deny it to other equally qualified candidates. This
second problem is rather common, for example, among groups that claim
to have a right to self-determination.
4.

INCLUSION

The problem of over and under-inclusion possibly generated by the
group right must be morally outweighed by the benefits that the right
brings about. Many group rights commonly create a double frustration.
On the one hand, some individuals who would need or deserve the
benefit provided by the group right do not qualify as members of one of
the groups that hold the right to the benefit, and therefore are excluded
from its enjoyment. On the other hand, some individuals do not really
need or deserve, or even want, the benefit for which they qualify as
group members. To summarize, in order to provide benefits to a group
that qualifies as a whole, granting a group right brings about the cost of
providing benefits to individuals who do not qualify but belong to the
group, while not helping out individuals who need this kind of benefit
but do not belong to the group. This is known as the problem of over and
under-inclusion. \0 Over and under-inclusion may be considered
extremely serious or merely a minor problem, depending on the
importance that is assigned to this cost, which would have to be
examined on a case-by-case basis.
A pertinent question in examining the relevance of the over and underinclusion problem is whether or not there are alternative policies that can
obtain similar results with lesser costs. Even when it is concluded that no
better policies are available, it must still be acknowledged, however, that
10.

Joseph Tussman & Jacobus TenBroek, The Equal Protection of The Laws, 37 CAL. L.

REV. 341 (1949).
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something clearly unsatisfactory is happening when under and overinclusion occurs. It might be acceptable to grant the group right in such a
case, but it should not be forgotten that better ways of addressing the
issue at stake must be looked for.

5.

LACK OF OPPRESSION

Groups do not have the right to oppress their members. The leading idea
here is that individual and group rights need to be consistent. This is
probably the hottest area in the entire debate about group rights. What we
find at the edges is harsh disagreement about the extension and limits of
the concept of oppression. I want to point out that such a disagreement at
the edges progressively dissolves, nevertheless, as we get closer to the
core of the concept of oppression, and this is of critical importance.
Think of the following way of fleshing out the anti-oppression condition
in the abstract presentation of a claim: "a claim to the group right of
maintaining or revitalizing the ancient group tradition of slavery is not a
right." Or else, in recognition of the specific right holders: "the right to
self-determination ought not to be granted to a group that openly plans to
commit genocide, or to a group that has already taken some steps in this
direction, until these plans or practices are gone." Constraints like these
would meet with very little opposition from group-rights defenders. This
proves that the anti-oppression condition does have some practical
relevance. How much and how far it can go is another issue that lies
beyond the boundaries of this presentation. Undoubtedly, the challenge is
to define "oppression," in other words, to single out those individual
human rights that have priority over any claimed group right.
This constraint would be understood more generously by some grouprights defenders than it would by others. Will Kyrnlicka, for example,
establishes a similar constraint in his theory of differentiated citizenship,
in which he prohibits any "internal restriction" against group members. 12
Other defenders of group rights such as Chandran Kukathas or Charles
Taylor would accept the anti-oppression constraint only if the concept of
oppression were understood in a very narrow sense.13 Taylor gives great
value to at least one putative group right, the right to cultural
preservation, and thinks that this right has priority over a number of

12.
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995).
13.
Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in 20 POL. THEORY 105 (1992);
Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS (Ian Shapiro & Will
Kymlicka eds., 1997); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND
'THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION' (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992).
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individual rights - i.e., it has priority over the right of parents to choose
the language in which they want to educate their children. Kukathas
holds a more radical view, according to which the only individual right is
the right to be free to leave one's own cultural community, "all other
rights being either derivative of this right, or rights granted by the
community."14 Kukathas claims that this does not entail group rights, and
therefore I am misrepresenting his self-understanding when using him as
an example of a defender of group rights. It is hard to see, however, what
else but a group right of some sort - i.e., to collective self-rule - this
power to grant individual rights that Kukathas assigns to groups could
be. In different ways, both Taylor and Kukathas see the current list of
individual human rights as too long and too intrusive. They both think
that defending group interests demands shortening individual rights.
Their views are hardly compatible with the current system of protection
of human rights. They are implicitly asking for a profound reform of this
system.
This condition that tries to prevent the legal recognition of oppressive
practices, therefore, might be universally agreeable only at a bare
minimum. It is, however, crucial to fix this minimum that group claims
cannot trespass. Precisely because it is a minimum, it expresses the most
fundamental conditions for human dignity. Its recognition and protection
is far from trivial. Under contemporary international law, the
international and regional declarations of human rights have been so far
the best-suited instruments to fix this minimum. Consistency demands
that any recognition of group rights incompatible with these declarations
brings about an explicit reform and adjustment of all relevant
international legal instruments. Otherwise, the group claim ought not to
be granted as a group right. It is rather obvious that enlarging the list of
human rights, by adding group rights openly incompatible with
previously recognized individual rights without making the necessary
legal adjustments first - i.e., eliminating the conflicting individual right
from the list or qualifying it - would not merely increase rights inflation
and confusion, it would make the protection of the incompatible rights
highly impracticable. In any case, the question of what individual rights
have priority over group claims needs to be answered before the
constraint that tries to prevent oppression can be neatly defined.
The literature on group rights often gives the impression that how to
define 'oppression' or this constraint regarding its prevention is the only
issue at stake. By suggesting four additional admissibility conditions of
14.

Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, supra note 13, at 238.
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group rights, I hope to have shown that it is not. By putting it in negative
terms, as a requirement that ought not to be violated, I also hope to have
provided a way of granting a number of group rights - the ones that
pass the requirement without any controversy - as well as a way of
rejecting some group-rights claims - the ones that fail the requirement
without any controversy. This approach is a way of avoiding, as much as
possible, the risk of complete paralysis arising from the substantive
controversy's inconclusive nature.
I shall add two final considerations. First, the conditions above need to
be interpreted. Secondly, whether or not a specific group claim meets
those conditions needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This
leaves room for disagreement. There is, however, no other way to
establish legal rules. This is exactly what adjudication is all about. Not
only adjudication, but also continuous discussion may narrow the range
of interpretations available. Were such not the case, at least the previous
conditions will serve to single out some of the main points of
disagreement and to clarify, to some extent, the limits of our consensus
on this issue.
If the set of conditions that I have suggested is found acceptable -

either
unaltered or with some modification - then it must be concluded that
there might be some unproblematic group rights. I shall leave open here
whether or not there are any, which rights they are and who are the rightbearers. Nathan Lerner once wrote that "What seems beyond doubt is
the need, at the national as well as the international level, to deal with the
recognition of group rights, establishing a minimum standard in this
respect that may help to reduce tension, friction, and violence."15 Here I
have tried to take a tentative step forward in this direction.

15.

Nathan Lerner, The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law, in PEoPLES AND

MINORITIES IN iNTERNATIONAL LAw 77-101, 100 (Catherine Briilman et al. eds., 1996).
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